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Could the collective guarantee




International Human Rights Bodies are familiar with the issue of coexistence of
multiple adjudication proceedings. However, the issues currently raised by the
increasing number of inter-State applications brought before the European Court of
Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) under Article 33 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (‘ECHR’), and especially, their coexistence with individual applications under
Article 34 ECHR that concern the same legal issues and are based on the same
factual background are unprecedented. The ECHR itself and the Rules of Court
do not provide any guidance on the coexistence of the two types of applications.
While Article 35 (2) (b) ECHR addresses the issue of international parallel actions,
this provision is not applicable to internal parallel actions, i.e. other applications
pending before the same court, namely the ECtHR. Therefore, this short note
aims at discussing the current practice and some of the challenges raised by such
applications. A particular focus lies on the autonomy of the affected individuals to
take legal action.
 
The need to affirm the absence of hierarchy between Article 33 and 34 ECHR
 Before exploring the technical issues, it should be kept in mind that the ECHR is
based on the coexistence of two mechanisms of protection that should be treated
with equal importance through the reform process. ‘Inter-States application’ is often
described as the technical means to achieve a collective guarantee. The philosophy
underlying this inter-State mechanism is well-known and constantly highlighted in
the current reform process. The ECHR has a special content that creates a certain
“European public order.” Accordingly, each State is the bearer of erga omnes partes
obligations and is entitled, through Article 33 ECHR, to defend the European public
order. However, behind this fiction, one should ask whether the current pending
inter-State complaints are genuinely aimed at defending the so-called “European
public order” or whether they serve in fact private State interests, as is the case
before the International Court of Justice. This question is often left out from the
discussion. In practice, the Court has proceeded to give a certain priority to inter-
State cases, by adjourning the examination of individual applications as long as
the “overarching issues” that are deriving from a parallel inter-State dispute have
not been decided (e.g. Berdzenishvili and Others v. Russia, para. 4). To justify this
priority policy in favor of the inter-State mechanism, academics and other experts
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affirm that Article 33 ECHR serves a “public goal”, while Article 34 ECHR would
serve a “private goal”. The reality is much more complex and should be questioned.
In addition, with regard to the individual complaint mechanism, described by the
European Court as “one of the keystones” (Klass et al. v. Germany, para. 34) of
the ECHR, it should be kept in mind that the recognition of the procedural means to
defend one’s rights is a crucial feature of the international legal personality of private
persons. From a theoretical point of view, this is one of the major achievements of
the ECHR. Therefore, the priority given to a type of action (inter-State complaints)
has an important impact on the other type of action (individual complaints). In other
words, the choices that are being made to improve the efficiency of the Court are
not only of a technical nature and should not be treated as such. To give priority to
inter-State actions over individual complaints may radically change the nature of the
ECHR mechanism, and the procedural position of (in)dependence of the individuals
vis-à-vis the States.
Current practice of the Court
 ven if the situation of potential overlap between outstanding inter-State and
individual complaints is rather new, some principles of coexistence can already be
derived from the jurisprudence.
First, there is no rule of exclusion between an Article 33 ECHR complaint and an
Article 34 ECHR complaint. As indicated in Varnava and others v. Turkey, an inter-
State application on the same facts does not mean that the individual complaint
lacks legal interest and should be struck off the list (para. 119). In Varnava, the
respondent State argued that the “disappearances of the missing” persons had
already been “subject to examination and adjudication” (para. 114), therefore calling
into question the legal interest in deciding the individual applications. In response,
the Court recognized that the previous Cyprus v. Turkey judgment, “included findings
of violations under Articles 2, 3 and 5 ECHR concerning missing Greek Cypriots
and their families.” (para. 118). However, the Court added that the criteria to reject a
complaint under Article 35 (2) (b) ECHR (parallel proceedings) were not met (para.
118). The Varnava principle means first that the Court does not apply by analogy the
prohibition of parallel international actions to parallel internal actions. Second, even
when an individual situation is addressed in an inter-State application, the individuals
still have a legal interest in lodging a complaint under Article 34. Therefore, their
legal right to lodge an application is not eclipsed by previous inter-State complaints.
This position was later backed by the 2018 Copenhagen Declaration, highlighting
the importance of not limiting the Court’s jurisdiction (para. 54(c) of the declaration),
and reaffirmed by the Court in its jurisprudence, e.g. in Berdzenishvili et al. v. Russia
(para. 37).
Second, it also derives from the practice of the Court that some statements made
on the factual background in an inter-State application are retained in individual
complaints. The question of administrative practice or other factual elements
analyzed in an inter-State complaint are used when dealing with an individual
complaint (para. 49). This means that even if the two complaints are of different
nature, the Court takes duly account of the statements and conclusions reached in
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its previous decisions. This approach is welcome, since it significantly reduces the
risk of contradiction and inconsistency. By consequence, this fear which has been
put forward by some States in the reform process, should not be overestimated.
 Third, under the current practice of the Court, in case of parallel actions, priority is
given to the examination of inter-State applications, as outlined in the Working group
report of 2020 (para. 41). This priority plays regardless of the date of introduction,
i.e. regardless of the fact that the individual complaints may have been lodged
before the inter-State application (Berdzenishvili, para. 4). Based on this priority,
the individual applications in relation with the content of the inter-States action is
adjourned, even if not totally frozen. Along the same lines, when the just satisfaction
issue is pending in an inter-State application, the Court may adjourn the examination
in individual complaints, as it did in some individual cases against Russia (e.g.
Berdzenishvili, para. 148).
Some challenges and unsolved questions
At the outset, some questions should be considered and have not received the
attention they deserve: whether the outstanding inter-States applications really serve
a collective goal and the European public order; whether the two mechanisms should
not rather be preserved on an equal footing; and whether the Court, as a Human
Rights Court, has reflected sufficiently deeply upon the shift of its role. It is not
certain that the Court is equipped, from a legal point of view, to address the issues
States are raising. This also transpires from the Georgia v. Russia (II) judgement :
“If, as in the present case, the Court is to be entrusted with the task of assessing
acts of war and active hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict
outside the territory of a respondent State, it must be for the Contracting Parties to
provide the necessary legal basis for such a task.” (emphasis added, para. 142).
Having said that, the question remains, what does the priority policy in favor of inter-
States applications mean for individual applications?
First, the impact of adjourning individual applications is problematic and should
be addressed. Indeed, due to the complex factual background, numerous legal
questions and pieces sent by the States Parties to the Court, the proceeding in inter-
State cases may be excessively long, first to reach an admissibility decision, then (in
case of split) a decision on the merits, third, a decision on just satisfaction and finally,
the implementation of the judgment. Based on the previously decided cases, it may
take more than twenty years before going back to an individual application, which
raise serious concerns in terms of legitimacy of the Court and quality of the justice
that it delivers.
 Second, the issue of just satisfaction has been raised in the current discussion
of the Steering Committee and the question whether a list of the victims should
be indicated at the outset of an inter-State application or when dealing with just
satisfaction (paras. 6 and 45). In addition, some concerns were raised about the
possibility of an individual being granted monetary compensation twice (para. 42).
However, this concern must not be overestimated as Article 41 ECHR provides
a discretionary power to the Court to grant for just satisfaction (“if necessary”).
Therefore, if a victim has already been granted just satisfaction on the basis of an
- 3 -
inter-State application, the Court can take this into account when assessing the
relevance and amount of reparation in the individual application, and thus avoid any
duplication.
On just satisfaction, in Cyprus v. Turkey, the Court addressed the question of the
applicability of Article 41 ECHR to inter-State applications, referring to the Diallo
case dealt with by the ICJ (paras. 39-47). However, regarding the content of just
satisfaction, the statement of the Grand Chamber is limited. In Georgia v. Russia
(I), the Court also reminded that there are no “punitive or exemplary damage” to
be granted under Article 41 ECHR (para. 75). Furthermore, the Court explained
its “methodology” for awarding just satisfaction in case of non-pecuniary damage
(paras. 68-80).
Therefore, the current practice is extremely limited. Nevertheless, due to the massive
and large-scale nature of violations of human rights which are dealt with in inter-
State applications, the potential material damage suffered by thousands of victims,
the question of just satisfaction should be renewed. It could also take inspiration from
comparative practice, especially that of the International Criminal Court and the Inter-
American Court (see Article 35-2 of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, as exemplified in Chichupac v. Guatemala, 2016, paras.
63-65, 272-275), where both the adequate forms of reparation and the problem of
identification of victims were addressed. In addition, there are important works in the
field of transitional justice that could also be helpful. In his 2014 report, the former
UN Special Rapporteur on reparation analyzed the limits of a model of reparation
that relies on courts. He highlighted that redress in post-conflict situations or in case
of massive violations of human rights does not only mean to “distribute indemnities”
but implies other actions and reflections that are totally absent from the Court’s
practice (para. 47).
 Third, in case of a friendly settlement in an inter-State application, the reform would
have to be very clear on the impact of this settlement both on the admissibility,
on the merits and on the just satisfaction to be granted to the victims in case of
violations of the ECHR (on friendly settlements, see Keller/Piskóty and Wenzel).
 Conclusion
As highlighted by President Spano in his opening statement to the Conference, the
European Court is facing “exceptional challenges” due to parallel inter-State and
individual applications, which deal with complex factual backgrounds, allegations of
administrative practices and massive violations of human rights. As also underlined
by the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Pej#inovi# Buri#, the Court
has to deliver justice in cases of large-scale violations of human rights. In these
circumstances, technical and pragmatic reforms must be envisaged. However,
one of the central pillars of the ECHR must also be preserved: one of its greatest
achievements, i.e. the individual right of application. The words of the Court in
Klass et al. v. Germany should be kept in mind: “The procedural provisions of the
Convention must, in view of the fact that the Convention and its institutions were
set up to protect the individual, be applied in a manner which serves to make the
system of individual applications efficacious.” (para. 34).
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